The issue of existence - quiddity difference is one of the important issues that were put forward for the first time in Islamic philosophy without having any background in Greek philosophy. Aristotle's metaphysics which is the main source of the first philosophy contains only synonymous and verbal meaning ofexistence. The issue of existence - quiddity difference has no room in Aristotle's works. This issue was proposed first by Farabi and then was completed by Ibn sina. In Islamic philosophy when it (...) is proved that existence in the mind is neither identical with quiddity nor a part of it but differs with it and is excess of it, that is, when it is proved that existence occurs on quiddity, this question arises that how is their relation in the outside? Whether existence occurs on quiddity or existence and quiddity are identical in the external world? To this question the Islamic philosophers answer that existence and quiddity are identical in the outside and it isimpossible that they differ from each other in the external world. The importance of this issue is that it finally led to the origination of the doctrine of the principality of existence which is known as the culmination of Islamic philosophy. The main goal of this article is study this issue and its impact upon the origination of the doctrine of the principiality of existence. (shrink)

This study of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī's (d. 631/1233) teachings on creation offers close analysis of all of his extant works of falsafa and kalām. Some of these were not known to previous scholars, yet they bear witness to key facets of the interaction between the historically inimical traditions of Hellenic philosophy and rational theology at this important intellectual moment. Al-Āmidīis seen to grapple with the encounter of two paradigms for the discussion of creation. On the one hand, Ibn Sīnā's (...) metaphysical concept of necessity of existence is the basis of his doctrine of the world's pre-eternal emanation. On the other, for the mutakallimūn, the physical theory of atomism bolsters the view that God created the world from nothing. This study is of interest to scholars of Ibn Sīnā and Ash'arism alike, as it advances our understanding of the ongoing tradition of rational theology in the Islamic world, long past Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's (d. 505/1111) famous attack on the philosophers. (shrink)

Given the proliferation of commentarial works in the post-Ghazālian era of Islamic intellectual history, the close study of individual commentaries has recently become a key schol­arly concern. To take us beyond the necessarily generalizing categories presented by Dimitri Gutas when he first charted the territory of this genre, an approach is needed that involves narrow textual analysis without neglecting the broader context in which a work is authored. Among the works that were initially taken by Gutas as evidence of the (...) “mainstream Avicennism” of their authors is Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī’s (d. 631/1233) Kashf al-tamwīhāt fī sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt, in which he sets out to critique Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 610/1210) commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s Pointers and Reminders. In this article, I study the work from three perspectives. Firstly, I consider the con­tents of the Kashf, in terms of both the scope and the nature of its interaction with al-Rāzī’s first-order commentary on the Ishārāt. Secondly, I calibrate the findings of my textual analysis with materials taken from the accounts of al-Āmidī’s biographers, showing that these sources are mutually interpre­tive. Thirdly, I analyze the Kashf from within the context of his broader corpus. Together, I argue, these three perspec­tives contribute to a more nuanced understanding of what it means to describe al-Āmidī’s Kashf as a work of Avicennism. (shrink)

Muʻtazilite thinkers put forward the first systematic ideas for the relationship of essence and attributes, one of the most fundamental and complicated issues of Islamic theology, and comprehensive explanations to the question of God’s names. Although almost all the thinkers agreed on uṣūl al-khamsa, they differed in their approach to the principle of unity (tawḥīd). ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, who lived in the period when these approaches emerged, is a scholar who reveals his distinctive view of God’s names and attributes in (...) which heslightly differs from his contemporaries such as Abu al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf, Mu‘ammar b. ‘Abbād al-Sulamī and Ibrāhīm b. Sayyār al-Naẓẓām from the Basran Muʻtazila, by his extreme opinions on the Muʻtazilite principle of tawḥīd. He is one of thefour principle thinkers who presented original opinions in the early Basran Muʻtazila. Also he is the only known student of Hishâm al-Fuwaṭī and constitutes the last major circle of this tradition of knowledge that ended after him. This article aims to reveal the relationship between essence and attributes, the names and attributes of God in a holistic and systematic way in the thought of ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān. Unfortunately, his works have not survived to the present day and has not received the attention he deserves. Since his views were scattered in the classic books, our study was focused primarily on these classical sources. The modern literature was not ignored, either. The relevant records, analysis and criticism were re-contextualized. According to ‘Abbād b. Sulaymān, the view that “Allah is a thing” is the same with the view that “Allah is other (ghayr)”, he draws attention to a definite distinction between Allah and human beings. In his thought about the relationship between Allah and space, he rejects the idea that God could be related to space or anything spatial in order to refrain from an anthropomorphic conception of God. In the case of visibility (ru’ya) of Allah, he radically opposes the idea of “seeing Allah with the heart,” which was adopted by the majority of the Muʻtazila. He tries to solve the issue in his own terms by avoiding the terms essence (dhāt) and nafs in the relationship between God’s essence and His attributes. He reveals a unique classification of names and thus adopts the method of analogy. He does not accept essential attributes as the majority of the Mu’tazila did. On the other hand, he tacitly accepts that Allah’s names have their own meanings in a way that they are not merely words (aqvāl). By a true comparison or perfect analogy (fī ḥaqīqati’l-qıyās), while he rejects that God is ālim, qadīr etc., he tries to ground that human beings is ālim, qadīr etc. He does not admit that God is eternally samʻi and baṣīr. Without interpreting samʻi as His knowledge or baṣīr as His power, he accepts that each name has a distinctive functionality. He rejects the assumption that God knows conditionally. Regarding the issue of whether living beings are in the knowledge of Allah before they exist, it makes a dual distinction: “a direction that can be subject to the eternal knowledge” and “the direction in which it actually came to existence”. Because of his view of non-existent and creatures, Ibn al-Rāwandī and modern resources refer the view of the eternity of objects to him. However, when the relevant records are examined, it is seen that this claim is not valid. According to ‘Abbād, Allah is capable of creating possible things that he knows, although He does not create impossible things that he knows, even though He is capable of creating them potentially (bi-al-quwwa). Allah has not created evil, neither literally nor figuratively; so much so that He created only man, not faith and unbelief. It is not possible to talk about any good that he did not create. He defends the createdness of the Qur’an (Khalq al-Qur’ān) by saying that the Qur’ān was created of accidents. About God’s names, he states that God has the names indicating His relationship to the universe. He does not accept that in eternity He is a willing agent, creator etc. However, he also does not accept the otherwise. He emphasizes that creation is reserved only for Allah. On the other hand, according to him, Allah creates without secondary causes and thus does not create things for a specific purpose. Regarding the revealed attributes (or informative attributes, khabarī), he recites these expressions only when reading of the Quran.He states that these expressions should not be used for Allah under any circumstances. He avoids naming Allah as wakīl, kafīl, laṭīf, kā’in, fard and mutakallim as he says that the name wāḥid should be used only for praising Him. (shrink)

The “lost” Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī treatises recently discovered in the Tehran codex Marwī 19 include a record of a philosophical debate instigated by the Ḥamdānid prince Sayf-al-Dawla. More precisely, Marwī 19 contains Yaḥyā’s adjudication of a dispute between an unnamed Opponent and Yaḥyā’s younger relative Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAdī (who also served as al-Fārābī’s assistant), along with Ibrāhīm's response to Yaḥyā’s adjudication, and Yaḥyā’s final word. At issue was a problem of Aristotelian exegesis: should “body” be understood as falling under (...) the category of substance or under the category of quantity? The unnamed Opponent argues that body is a species of substance; Ibrāhīm argues that technically speaking, body is a species of quantity, and hence an accident; and Yaḥyā judges that body is a species of substance, though for very different reasons than the Opponent gives. For the first time, the Arabic text of this exchange is edited and translated into English. Also provided is an Introduction that sets the debate in historical context, and discusses in particular the possible influence of John Philoponus. The debate is interesting and important not only because of the philosophical ramifications of the issues under discussion, but because it constitutes evidence of dialectical practice among Arabic-speaking philosophers from the middle of the 10th century. (shrink)

Kindī, d. ca. 873; terminology; philosophy, Islamic; dictionaries.

This study seeks to investigate the treatise of Abū al-Hasan b. Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī al- Shāfiʻī (d. after 1028/1619) entitled Fatḥ al-Raḥīm al-Raḥmān fī tafsīr Āyat "inna Allāha yaʼmuru bi al-ʻadl wa al-iḥsān" based on the manuscript of the author. Shedding light on the translation of this unknown scholar, as it is evident from the title of the treatise that it contains the interpretation of this verse, which is well known among scholars and commentators as the most (...) comprehensive verse in the Qur’ān. In this tafsīr, Shirbīnī used many exegetical methods such as exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Qur'ān, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the Sunnah, exegesis of the Qur'ān with the sayings of the Companions, and al-tafsīr bi-al-raʼy, as well as tafsīr approaches such as linguistic tafsīr, the science of munāsabāt, and causality of nuzūl to analyze the meanings of the verse in depth. Another feature that increases the importance of this treatise is that al-Shirbīnī refers to the primary source tafsīr books together with their glosses, sometimes quoting from the commentators verbatim, and sometimes making meaning-based quotations from them, which is the most obvious indication of his exegetical ability and scholarly competence. In this work, he adopted a syncretic approach while emphasizing the meanings of the verse and followed an analytical-critical method while examining the subject. For this reason, he analyzed all the words in the verse one by one, dwelt on the meanings and interpretation of the words, and criticized their views after including the views of the commentators. Therefore, he applied the analytical exegesis method very successfully in this work. Accordingly, he analyzed the narrations related to tafsīr and mentioned the Companions' names during the narration. In particular, he analyzed the narrations from Ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/687-88) about the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, and stated that there was a dispute between the narrations about the phrase al-iḥsān. He took a scientific stance on the derivation of the word "Allah,” debated between those who accepted it and those who rejected it. He stated that the derivation of the word was not satisfactory and reliable. In the tafsīr of the words al-ʻAdl and al-iḥsān, he discussed the isnāds in Muqātil b. Sulayman’s (d.150/767) tafsīr emphasizing that he received the tafsīr of al-ʻAdl from Ibn 'Abbas and the tafsīr of al-iḥsān from 'Ali b. Abī Tālib. This approach is an important example for the isnād analyses of Muqātil b. Sulayman who was criticized for neglecting isnād chains in his tafsīr. He also criticized al-Baydāwī for being influenced by some of Zamakhsharī's sectarian and theological views. He classified the issue of kinship according to usūl, furū', and hawāshī, expanded the meaning of the verse, and insisted that the message of this verse encompasses all relatives, regardless of the degree of kinship. He was influenced by Latāʾif al-Ishārāt, al-Kashshāf, Mafātīhu al-ghayb, al-Baydawī, Hāshiya al-Jurjānī ala al-Kashshāf, and his grandfather al-Khatīb al-Shirbīnī’s (d.977/1570) al-Sirāj al-munīr. (shrink)

On Islamic ethics and Muslims conduct of life.

Contrary to the widespread assumption, philosophy in the Islamic world did not begin with al-Kindi nor ended with Ibn Rushd (Averroes). This article looks into the metaphysics part of Sayf al-Din al-Amidi's kitab al-Nur al-Bahir fi al-Hikam al-Zawahir ('The Splendid Light on the Bright Wisdom') in order to show the continuity of philosophy in post-classical period.

The Arabic philosophical fable _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _is a classic of medieval Islamic philosophy. Ibn Tufayl, the Andalusian philosopher, tells of a child raised by a doe on an equatorial island who grows up to discover the truth about the world and his own place in it, unaided—but also unimpeded—by society, language, or tradition. Hayy’s discoveries about God, nature, and man challenge the values of the culture in which the tale was written as well as those of every contemporary society. (...) Goodman’s commentary places _Hayy Ibn Yaqzan _in its historical and philosophical context. The volume features a new preface and index, and an updated bibliography. “One of the most remarkable books of the Middle Ages.”—_Times Literary Supplement_ “An enchanting and puzzling story.... The book transcends all historical and cultural environments to settle upon the questions of human life that perpetually intrigue men.”—_Middle East__ Journal_ “Goodman has done a service to the modern English reader by providing a readable translation of a philosophically significant allegory.”—_Philosophy East and West_ “Add[s] bright new pieces to an Islamic mosaic whose general shape is already known.”—_American Historical Review_. (shrink)

Freethought and atheism in classical Islam -- Arabic philosophy and its influence on Western freethought -- The treatise of the three impostors : Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad, and its origins in Islam -- Averroes and Ibn Tufayl, and their influence on Western freethought -- Atheism, freethought and Islam in the 19th, 20th, and 21st Century -- Conclusion : The Allah that failed.

Quotations of different world philosophers.

The Exalted Fath: Ha-Emunah ha-Ramah Transleted by Solomon Ibn Lavi, Ha-Emunah ha-Nissaʼah Transleted by Samuel Ibn Matut, The Anonymous Commentary to HaEmunah ha-Ramah.